police militarisation versus criminal
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DISCLAIMER
29 November 2007: Police Militarisation Versus Criminal Militarisation
In the last few weeks the media has reported on various cash-in-transit (CIT) robberies where police reaction led to the killing and arrest of a number of criminals. CIT robbers are known to be armed with automatic weapons such as AK47’s, and lately also R4’s and R5’s, normally used by the security forces. They often operate in groups of up to fifteen or more and carry out their attacks with ‘military precision’, which points to a certain element of military training and military expertise. This is probably due to the fact that some of these criminals were in the past members of the police, the military or the military units of liberation movements. In isolated incidents even serving members of the security forces have been linked to CIT robberies. There is also strong evidence of the involvement of foreigners with similar backgrounds in bank and CIT robberies in South Africa.
The recent successes of the police in confrontations with these militarised criminal gangs, have elicited praise from various quarters. It would appear that the ‘winning’ of these kinds of ‘battles’ against criminals who seem to be able to act with impunity, has a reassuring affect on the public. It carries the message that criminals are not in control and enhances confidence in the police. According to the police their recent successes are the result of a targeted strategy to reduce CIT robberies. This involves close cooperation with SABRIC (South African Banking Risk and Information Centre) and the CIT industry, together with good intelligence, including information provided by the public. But no amount of intelligence will help if the police do not have the ability to act on it. As a consequence the police deploy highly trained and specialised units such as the Special Task Force (STF) and the National Intervention Unit (NIU) for this purpose.
The STF and NIU are widely regarded as elite police units and are more ‘militarised’ than the rest of the police. Members of these units have to pass through a stringent selection and training process. Their training is very similar to that of the so-called SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams in police organisations across the United States and, in some respects, the STF is even more advanced. They are trained and equipped to deal with high risk situations and in their ranks they will have a number of specialists, including snipers and explosives experts. Fully dressed in their operational outfit they may even look more military than some soldiers. Also projecting a more militarised image of the police are the Crime Combating Units (CCU’s), who are responsible, inter alia, for crowd management. In addition, the police have in recent years introduced a ‘street survival’ course for all its members outside the above specialised units, involving more advanced training in the use of firearms and the handling of dangerous situations.
The strengthening of, or growth in militarism in, police organisations is certainly not unique to South Africa. According to the Wall Street Journal (November 2006), police agencies in the United States show a clear shift to officer safety and para-military training. This is insightful considering that a police official in South Africa has an eight times higher probability rate of being killed than his American counterpart: in the US in 2005, 51 police officers out of a total of more than 700 000 were killed compared to 95 out of approximately 120 000 in SA during the same period. According to the Washington Post (February 2006) the militarisation of American police agencies have now developed to the stage that tactics once reserved for rare, volatile situations such as terrorist incidents, hostage takings and bank robberies, are increasingly being used for routine police work. In the 1980’s, for example, SWAT teams were called out on average 3 000 times a year, and by 2006 that number had increased to approximately 40 000 times a year.
The question is whether the presence of an element of militarism in the police is good or bad? There are, of course, strong arguments in favour of such an element of militarism. Like the military, the police are vested with coercive powers, including the power to use deadly force. The police, like the military, are exposed to dangerous working conditions and having a type of organisation and discipline, very similar to that of the military, that enables them to control their coercive powers and to survive in dangerous conditions, seems logical. Arguments against police militarism will obviously focus on the dangers of abuse and the use of unnecessary violence.
In the end the answer seems to be a choice between two evils. The presence of firearms and a widespread readiness to use them, together with the availability of military expertise among criminals, have completely changed the nature of crime in South Africa. Either the police maintain a capability to meet this threat or, at some stage, as was called for during 2006, the military is called in. Using the military in a policing role in a democracy is something that should be avoided. It seems, therefore, that a limited degree of militarisation of the police appears to be the lesser evil in this case.
DISCLAIMER
29 November 2007: Police Militarisation Versus Criminal Militarisation
In the last few weeks the media has reported on various cash-in-transit (CIT) robberies where police reaction led to the killing and arrest of a number of criminals. CIT robbers are known to be armed with automatic weapons such as AK47’s, and lately also R4’s and R5’s, normally used by the security forces. They often operate in groups of up to fifteen or more and carry out their attacks with ‘military precision’, which points to a certain element of military training and military expertise. This is probably due to the fact that some of these criminals were in the past members of the police, the military or the military units of liberation movements. In isolated incidents even serving members of the security forces have been linked to CIT robberies. There is also strong evidence of the involvement of foreigners with similar backgrounds in bank and CIT robberies in South Africa.
The recent successes of the police in confrontations with these militarised criminal gangs, have elicited praise from various quarters. It would appear that the ‘winning’ of these kinds of ‘battles’ against criminals who seem to be able to act with impunity, has a reassuring affect on the public. It carries the message that criminals are not in control and enhances confidence in the police. According to the police their recent successes are the result of a targeted strategy to reduce CIT robberies. This involves close cooperation with SABRIC (South African Banking Risk and Information Centre) and the CIT industry, together with good intelligence, including information provided by the public. But no amount of intelligence will help if the police do not have the ability to act on it. As a consequence the police deploy highly trained and specialised units such as the Special Task Force (STF) and the National Intervention Unit (NIU) for this purpose.
The STF and NIU are widely regarded as elite police units and are more ‘militarised’ than the rest of the police. Members of these units have to pass through a stringent selection and training process. Their training is very similar to that of the so-called SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams in police organisations across the United States and, in some respects, the STF is even more advanced. They are trained and equipped to deal with high risk situations and in their ranks they will have a number of specialists, including snipers and explosives experts. Fully dressed in their operational outfit they may even look more military than some soldiers. Also projecting a more militarised image of the police are the Crime Combating Units (CCU’s), who are responsible, inter alia, for crowd management. In addition, the police have in recent years introduced a ‘street survival’ course for all its members outside the above specialised units, involving more advanced training in the use of firearms and the handling of dangerous situations.
The strengthening of, or growth in militarism in, police organisations is certainly not unique to South Africa. According to the Wall Street Journal (November 2006), police agencies in the United States show a clear shift to officer safety and para-military training. This is insightful considering that a police official in South Africa has an eight times higher probability rate of being killed than his American counterpart: in the US in 2005, 51 police officers out of a total of more than 700 000 were killed compared to 95 out of approximately 120 000 in SA during the same period. According to the Washington Post (February 2006) the militarisation of American police agencies have now developed to the stage that tactics once reserved for rare, volatile situations such as terrorist incidents, hostage takings and bank robberies, are increasingly being used for routine police work. In the 1980’s, for example, SWAT teams were called out on average 3 000 times a year, and by 2006 that number had increased to approximately 40 000 times a year.
The question is whether the presence of an element of militarism in the police is good or bad? There are, of course, strong arguments in favour of such an element of militarism. Like the military, the police are vested with coercive powers, including the power to use deadly force. The police, like the military, are exposed to dangerous working conditions and having a type of organisation and discipline, very similar to that of the military, that enables them to control their coercive powers and to survive in dangerous conditions, seems logical. Arguments against police militarism will obviously focus on the dangers of abuse and the use of unnecessary violence.
In the end the answer seems to be a choice between two evils. The presence of firearms and a widespread readiness to use them, together with the availability of military expertise among criminals, have completely changed the nature of crime in South Africa. Either the police maintain a capability to meet this threat or, at some stage, as was called for during 2006, the military is called in. Using the military in a policing role in a democracy is something that should be avoided. It seems, therefore, that a limited degree of militarisation of the police appears to be the lesser evil in this case.
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